Legalize It: An argument for formalizing petty corruption wen state capacity is low by Sundell, Anders
  
 
 
 
LEGALIZE IT:  
 
An argument for formalizing petty corruption when state capacity 
is low 
 
ANDERS SUNDELL 
 
 
  
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 2012:2 
 
QOG THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE 
Department of Political Science 
University of Gothenburg 
Box 711, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG 
March 2012 
ISSN 1653-8919 
© 2012 by Anders Sundell. All rights reserved. 
 
 2 
Legalize it: An argument for formalizing petty corruption when state capacity is low 
Anders Sundell  
QoG Working Paper Series 2012:2 
March 2012 
ISSN 1653-8919 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Corruption in the form of informal payments to bureaucrats for public services are a major prob-
lem around the world. There are however few theories of how countries can get rid of corruption. I 
argue that petty corruption must be understood not only as a problem, but also as a way of financ-
ing public services when state capacity is low. If the state is unable to collect revenue from citizens 
and pay decent wages to bureaucrats, citizens and bureaucrats can engage in a direct transaction: 
informal payments in exchange for services. 
 
Still, the unpredictability and secrecy of corruption has negative consequences for citizens. I there-
fore suggest that the situation could be improved by formalizing informal payments; a modest im-
provement for corruption-stricken societies, but in contrast to other suggested reforms, more fea-
sible. The argument is illustrated with a study of the formalization of informal payments in Sweden 
during the 19th century. 
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Introduction 
It is by now a well-known fact that corruption in a society has negative consequences for economic 
growth, human development and generalized trust (Holmberg, Rothstein, and Nasiritousi 2009; 
Mauro 1995). Cross-country comparative research has also identified several correlates of corrup-
tion (Treisman 2007). However, while we know the characteristics of countries that are corrupt and 
of those that are not, how a country is to escape the corrupt category is still largely unknown. Since 
it has been convincingly shown that corruption creates a stable equilibrium in which continued 
corruption is the rational option for  the involved actors (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell 2011), it has 
been suggested that it is necessary to implement a major reform during a short period of time to 
push a country out of the equilibrium (Aidt 2003; Rothstein 2011). 
 
However, such a reform requires that political leaders are genuinely interested in curbing corrup-
tion, or in other words, that the political principal is benevolent (Aidt 2003). At the same time, 
“political will” is a very poor predictor of positive development, as it usually is used tautologically: 
unsuccessful and corrupt leaders surely must have lacked political will, while those that succeeded 
must have been truly committed to reform (Persson & Sjöstedt 2010). If one then assumes that 
political leaders not are benevolent, are any reforms possible? 
 
It is hard to conceive of a reform initiated by corrupt political leaders aimed at eradicating “grand” 
corruption, in which lawmakers take bribes in exchange for setting policy that benefits powerful 
interests in society, since it is a form of corruption that benefits leaders directly. But another im-
portant aspect is the “petty”, bureaucratic, type of corruption, in which public employees take 
bribes in exchange for services that ought to be free. The political leaders may benefit also from 
this type of corruption if income from bribes are passed along upwards in the hierachy. It is how-
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ever also likely that this type of corruption impairs efficiency in the state apparatus, which may 
decrease the revenues that the leaders wishes to extract.  
 
In this paper, I argue that leaders (benevolent and non-benevolent) tolerate petty corruption be-
cause it is easy – it allows for funding the salaries of bureaucrats directly from citizens and requires 
minimal administrative capacity on behalf of the state. There may however exist a reform that 
acknowledges the underlying demand for petty corruption, but still improves the situation, for citi-
zens, bureaucrats and leaders. It thus does not require a benevolent leader. The solution, I propose, 
is to legalize and formalize some kinds of petty corruption. Many undesirable consequences of 
corruption will still remain even afte the reform, but it will address one of the central problems, as 
identified by among others Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1993:612): “…bribes differ from 
taxes in one crucial way, namely, unlike taxation, corruption is usually illegal and must be kept se-
cret. Efforts to avoid detection and punishment cause corruption to be more discretionary than 
taxation.” Apart from the distortionary effects, secrecy and lack of regulation also causes uncertain-
ty and unpredictability, which is harmful both to the well-being of individuals and investment (Wei 
1997). 
 
I illustrate the feasability of the proposed solution by drawing on the example of 19th century Swe-
den. The records, I argue, show that lawmakers tolerated informal payments to bureaucrats because 
it was an easy way of financing the state. However, they also gradually made efforts to regulate, 
formalize and standardize these payments, which improved predictability for citizens, bureaucrats 
and the government. When that had been achieved, the government was able to gradually substitute 
these direct payments for fixed salaries for bureucrats, financed by user fees. These user fees often 
came in the form of a stamp tax. Finally, user fees were replaced by income taxes, but that was 
almost a hundred years after the first reforms to regulate corruption. It had been impossible for the 
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early 19th century Swedish state to go from a system where bureaucrats extracted their salaries di-
rectly from the populace to a fully functional, tax-financed, modern bureaucracy. Success was en-
sured through the imperfect intermediate steps, which I argue holds lessons for countries plagued 
by corruption today. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. First I review existing research on corruption eleimination, theo-
ry on government behavior in relation to petty corruption, and then what the adverse consequences 
of petty corruption and what the likely benefits of legalizing corruption are. I then describe how 
this paper differs from older research (e.g. Leff 1964) that argued that corruption could be positive 
for development. I then proceed to describe the process of formalizing and then transforming in-
formal payments to user fees in Sweden during the 19th century. The final portion of the paper 
discusses the results and concludes. 
 
Why governments tolerate petty corruption 
Research on corruption has the recent decades flourished, especially in the form of cross-country 
comparisons on aggregate levels of corruption (Treisman 2007). The design of political institutions 
has been shown to matter for the rule of law and corruption (Andrews and Montinola 2004; Tavits 
2007). Theoretical and empirical research have also demonstrated that political parties play an im-
portant role in political corruption, as they can target goods to citizens in exchange for votes 
(Stokes 2005; Nichter 2008), or use patronage to reward supporters and stay in power (Folke, Hira-
no and Snyder 2011). All in all, political corruption has garnered much attention. Bureaucratic, or 
petty, corruption remains understudied in political science given that it is the form of corruption 
that most directly affects citizens. 
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One reason for this deficit in both empirical research and theory may be that there are few modern 
success stories from which to learn from. Hong Kong and Singapore are usually held up as such 
examples, while Latvia, Estonia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain were found to have reliably 
improved their World Bank “Control of Corruption” score between 1996 and 2004 (Treisman 
2007). Theoretical insight from these cases has however been limited. For instance, in a review of 
corruption reform in Asian countries Quah (1999:485) states that “…for anticorruption measures 
to be effective, they must be properly designed (to attack the causes of corruption) , and they must 
be sponsored and upheld sincerely by political leaders.” Explanations for why Hong Kong and 
Singapore have succeeded tend to highlight determined and skillful political leadership as one of the 
key factors. While high quality leaders such as George Washington or Nelson Mandela may bring 
about positive changes in their countries, it is not much of a help to countries suffering from cor-
ruption today, especially since it seems nigh impossible to determine which leaders that have a gen-
uine commitment to reform ex ante (Persson and Sjöstedt forthcoming). 
 
In order to locate good anti-corruption policies, one should thus focus on theories that does not 
require leaders to want reform for reform’s sake. However, while Aidt (2003) categorizes theories 
deriving from Becker and Stigler (1974) as theories that assume a benevolent principal, the only 
assumption that one has to make about the principal is that revenue-maximization is the primary 
goal, which should be a fairly reasonable assumption (Levi 1988). In this perspective, the principal 
should have little interest to combat grand corruption, which benefits the principal directly, but 
more interest when it comes to combatting petty corruption. Timothy Besley and John MacLaren 
(1993) develop a model of wages and corruption among tax collectors. In their model, the govern-
ment wishes to decrease corruption in tax collection, as citizens are able to bribe tax collectors to 
withhold taxes from the state. By curbing corruption, the government is able to increase revenue 
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and thereby it’s influence. The assumption that governments wish to do this is more cautious than 
to assume that governments wish to curb corruption simply because it is better for the country. 
 
In Besley and MacLaren’s model, the government wishes to raise revenue through taxes, and em-
ploys tax inspectors to estimate the wealth of citizens. Citizens wish to avoid taxation, and are 
therefore willing to bribe the tax inspector to underreport the wealth for a sum that does not ex-
ceed what is due in tax. To avoid this, the government has two instruments at its disposal – wages 
and monitoring of tax inspectors. Both these alternatives are costly. Besley and McLaren consider 
three strategies for the government: to pay an efficiency wage, where wages are sufficiently high to 
deter bribe-taking, to pay a reservation wage, where both honest and dishonest tax inspectors will 
be interested in the tax inspection job, and a capitulation wage, in which case only dishonest indi-
viduals will be interested in becoming tax inspectors and bribery will flourish. 
 
The chosen strategy depends on both the efficiency of monitoring and the amount of revenue that 
is possible to raise from the population. When monitoring is ineffective, the efficiency wage be-
comes higher, as the government must pay much more to make the loss of a job sufficiently deter-
ring for the tax inspector. Besley & McLaren thus claim that inefficienct monitoring leads to the 
capitulation wage strategy, in which the government pays very low wages, that only attract dishon-
est individuals who supplements their income with bribes. The only revenue that the government 
receives is the one resulting from direct monitoring of tax inspectors. As the taxable income of the 
population increases, the role for efficiency and reservation wages (the difference being that there is 
some corruption in the reservation wage scenario) also increases. Monitoring is however still a fac-
tor. Accordingly, capitulation wages should be expected to be found in countries where tax income 
relative to GNP is low (Besley and McLaren 1993, 130). 
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The main insight of Besley and MacLarens model is the concept of capitulation wages, as it illus-
trates a situation in which the government has little interest in curbing corruption (in this case 
through raising wages) even though it does not profit from it. It is simply too costly, given the 
available capacity to monitor the behavior of the bureaucrats. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) 
confirm this as they find that there is a tentative negative relationship between public sector wages 
and corruption, but that massive wage raises are needed to eradicate corruption. They do however 
not take monitoring levels into account, which is unfortunate, as Besley and MacLaren predict that 
wage increases will be ineffective if monitoring is at a low level. But if we assume that governments 
in corrupt countries have little monitoring capacity, it is not surprising that the estimated link be-
tween wages and corruption is weak on average.1 Furthermore, as Aidt (2003) notes, capitulation 
wages seems to be the practice in many developing countries, lending credibility to the theory. 
 
Besley and MacLaren’s model concerns tax collectors, but there is good reason to suspect that 
many of the insights of the model are applicable also in other areas of the state apparatus. Consider 
the case of public service provision of for example health care. When it comes to tax collection, 
citizens and tax inspectors have a common interest in withholding revenue from the government. 
This is not really the case in the provision of public services, as citizens want something from the 
government. However, citizens would still like to receive this good for free, without paying taxes 
for it. The government wish to raise revenue through taxes, but do not want to spend more than 
necessary on wages for bureaucrats. The bureaucrats want wages, but do not want to put in too 
much effort in work. In order for the system to work, citizens must pay taxes, the government pay 
wages, and the civil servants provide public services.  
                                                     
1 Another influential study of the relationship between public sector wages and bureaucratic quality is that of Rauch and 
Evans (2000), in which no statistically significant correlation between wages and bureaucratic quality is found. However, 
the indicator of wage levels used by Rauch and Evans is a survey question directed to country experts, asking about the 
salaries of higher officials in government agencies, relative to managers in the private sector. This indicator should thus 
not be as valid when measuring the impact of wages on petty corruption, as it mostly concerns lower level bureaucrats. 
Van Rijkeghem and Weder (1997) instead use average wage levels in the entire public sector as their indicator. 
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There are many similarities between the problem of public service provision and the problem of tax 
collection described by Besley and MacLaren. The government can attract hard-working and talent-
ed bureaucrats by offering high wages, but must still monitor the bureaucrats to ensure that they 
put in enough effort in work. If the government estimates that it not has the capacity to monitor 
the bureaucrats, it will lower the wages, and the bureaucrats will accordingly not work. This will in 
turn reduce the willingness of citizens to pay taxes, as they do not receive any public services. Fur-
thermore, for bureaqucrats and citizens, the situation constitutes a collective action problem, as 
civil servants do not want to work if no other civil servant does so, and citizens do not want to pay 
tax if no one else does so. This outcome constitutes quite a stable equilibrium, which it may be hard 
to escape, but it does not mean that no services are provided to the citizens. 
 
In Besley and McLaren’s model, the tax inspector and citizen collude on withholding revenue from 
the government. In this case, bureaucrats and citizens can collude in the decision to provide a ser-
vice: the citizen can pay the bureaucrat directly, and the bureaucrat provides a service to the citizen. 
In this way, the government is kept out of the loop, and collective action problems are avoided.  
 
Informal payments in the health care sector are a clear example of this process. The authors of a 
study of informal payments in Georgia concluded that “…people ultimately prefer to rely on ser-
vices that can be obtained through direct market transactions, because that is the only way, they 
believe they would receive proper services.” (Belli, Gotsadze, and Shahriari 2004, 117). And the 
reason for why services would not be provided otherwise is that the health care practitioners are 
severly underpaid: “Of course it [the informal payments] benefits the physicians, but we should not 
be angry with them, because they are highly qualified specialists, and given that the state cannot pay 
them, they have to search for other sources” (Interviewee, cited in Balabanova och McKee 2002, 
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259). The notion of the interviewee is confirmed by more rigorous studies – one of the “coping 
strategies” of underpaid hospital staff is to demand informal payments (Van Lerberghe et al 2002). 
 
While these payments can be seen as user fees, it is important to differentiate them from official 
user fees. The crucial difference lies in who benefits from the fees. As a Bulgarian interviewee in a 
study by Balabanova and McKee (2002:248) pointed out, “income of a health facility and income of 
professionals are two different things”. When fees are paid to the health facility the civil servants 
only receive a fraction of the income generated for the facility, which means that both doctor and 
patient have an incentive for an informal exchange, in which the payment is somewhere in between 
the share the doctor would receive and the price the patient would pay if the payment was made 
formally (Belli, Gotsadze, och Shahriari 2004, 115). 
 
Hence, both in service provision and in tax collection, citizens and bureaucrats have incentives to 
cut a deal which excludes the state. In Besley and MacLarens model, the government may choose 
to only pay capitulation wages and tolerate some corruption. In many countries, bureaucrats have 
insufficient wages and supplement their income with informal payments from their clients. Interna-
tional surveys of informal payments in health care reveal that they are widespread. Surveys at the 
turn of the millenium revealed that the percent that reported making informal payments to health 
care providers exceeded 80 percent in Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Moldova (Lewis 2007). The 
government could try to enforce a ban on informal payments, but would then have to raise the 
wages and monitor the behavior of bureaucrats to make sure they did not shirk. Furthermore, to 
finance the wages, the government would have to ensure efficient tax collection. Instead, many 
governments choose to only pay capitulation wages and de facto tolerate the informal payments. 
Minimal effort is then required on behalf of the government, but some public services are still pro-
vided to the citizens. 
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Adverse consequences of petty corruption 
I thus argue that due to the demand for public services from citizens, and the convenience of the 
government, petty corruption arises and is largely tolerated. However, while the petty corruption 
solves one problem, it may have many undesirable features. In a seminal paper, Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert Vishny (1993) identify two main economic drawbacks of corruption. The first drawback 
relates to the quantity of goods produced, in a parsimonious model of corruption in the provision 
of complementary goods, such as permits needed from different agencies. The model should also 
apply to other basic goods, such as schooling and health care. Consider a monopolist agency that 
provides both goods, and sets the bribe prices of both. If the agency raises the bribe price on one 
good, it reduces demand for the other, and therefore sets the prices as to maximize bribe income 
and thereby output. On the other hand, the two goods may be provided by different agencies, or as 
termed by Shleifer and Vishny, independent monopolies. Each agency does not care about the 
demand for the other agencys goods, and thus sets the bribe price higher, which reduces overall 
demand. Shleifer and Vishny’s (1993:606) conclusion is that “By acting independently, the two 
agencies actually hurt each other, as well as the private buyers of the permits.” In a corrupt bureau-
cracy, each bureaucrat acts as an independent monopolist. If there were a joint monopoly, more 
goods would be produced, at a lower average cost for citizens. 
 
The second drawback concerns the type of goods produced. In a regular market, demand and prof-
it governs the production decisions. Suppliers produce goods that are profitable which there is 
demand for. But when the market is illegal, suppliers need to consider where the risk of detection is 
lowest. There is thus another factor other than demand that governs supply, and Shleifer and Vish-
ny (1993:612) thus conclude that “Efforts to avoid detection and punishment cause corruption to 
be more distortionary than taxation.” 
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A third drawback which is not explicitly discussed by Shleifer and Vishny, but by other economists, 
is that corruption is harmful not primarily through the direct cost of bribes, but because of the 
associated uncertainty. As put by Wei (1997:1) “…corruption, unlike tax, is not transparent, not 
pre-announced, and carries a much poorer enforcement of an agreement between a briber and a 
bribee. In other words, corruption embeds arbitrariness and creates uncertainty.” Wei proceeds to 
show empirically that corruption-induced uncertainty is similar to massive tax hikes. Fisman and 
Svensson (2006) also show that increases in bribery rates are about three times more harmful to 
growth than increases in tax rates of the same magnitude. On a personal level, it seems reasonable 
to assume, and anecdotal evidence indicates, that bribery and uncertainty is unpleasant for individu-
als. Regarding informal payments in health care, an interviewed Bulgarian physician provided the 
following quote (quoted in Balabanova and McKee 2002:261): 
 
“Often the price of these under-the-counter services is not set… It diminishes the self-esteem of the physician: to have 
money slipped into the pocket… the sum does not always correspond to what he did, but in many cases this is the only 
way of increasing income. In general, it is unpleasant for both sides.” 
 
Possible benefits of legalizing petty corruption 
If the state is unable to monitor bureaucrats and raise sufficient revenue to pay decent wages, it is 
likely that petty corruption will flourish. The optimal solution is obviously to address the underlying 
problems of lacking state capacity, but since that is an almost insurmountable challenge, an im-
provement of the situation may be to legalize and regulate some sorts of petty corruption. By doing 
so, I argue, transparency, predictability and equality in service delivery may be improved. 
 
The government should in such a reform act as a price-setter, and decide on apropriate tariffs for 
services. By doing so, it is possible that the problem of independent monopolies described by 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1993) would be alleviated. By determining prices centrally, taking the need for 
various services into account, total output can be increased. Both bureaucrats and citizens would 
gain from this. The absence of a supply and demand-driven price setting mechanism would obvi-
ously cause the system to work akin to a planned economy, which causes distortions in production 
decisions. For instance, it is likely that bureaucrats will attempt to produce services that have a high 
set price in relation to the service’s production cost. However, since the bureaucrats often are mo-
nopolists, regulation is necessary. Furthermore, distortions caused by imperfect prices are probably 
less distortionary than those caused by the need for secrecy and actions undertaken to avoid detec-
tion. They can also be addressed by adjusting prices. 
 
Finally, legalization and formalization of petty corruption would increase predictability and reduce 
uncertainty. Citizens can make better decisions on how to spend their income if they know what 
services cost beforehand. Furthermore, if the system is made legal, the state has a better chance of 
obtaining information about service utilization in different sectors, which makes it easier to plan for 
the state as well. 
 
In health care, formalization of informal payments has been suggested as a possible way forward by 
several scholars (c.f. Ensor 2004; Lewis 2007), there are few reported examples of attempts to ex-
plicitly do so, and while there is much research on the effects of introducing user fees in health 
care, as well as some research on the abolition thereof, few studies investigate the impact on infor-
mal payments (Ensor 2004).  
 
Barber, Bonnet and Bekedam (2004:201) report of a Cambodian attempt to formalize informal 
payments, and describe the objectives of the reform: “Formalizing and regulating existing under-
the-table payments would assure patients of fixed prices. Furthermore, hospital fees could be estab-
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lished at levels substantially less than the estimated under-the-table fees.” Flat fees were used for 
the most part, together with an exemption scheme for the poor, based on easily observable and 
understandable indicators (for instance the number of children and farm animals). While user fees 
not were retained by the staff, salaries were linked to a bonus scheme which rewarded presence at 
work and quality of service (Barber, Bonnet and Bekedam 2004:202). After the reform was intro-
duced, utilization of in-patient services increased substantially, and available evidence according to 
the authors of the study seem to suggest that “Take Hospital effectively eliminated under-the-table 
payments and controlled out-of-pocket hospital costs for patients…” (Barber, Bonnet and 
Bekedam 2004:2006). User fees also contributed to about one-third of the hospital budget. One 
possible explanation for why utilization would increase could be the transition from independent to 
joint monopolies, as discussed by Shleifer and Vishny (1993): appropriate prices increase demand 
and therefore generate the same level of revenue. 
 
Other descriptions of introductions of user fees have not been so rosy. In a comprehensive review 
of experiences of introducing user fees in Africa, Gilson (1997) concludes that there is a substiantal 
risk that user fees will deter utilization, especially among the poor. Even when there are exemption 
schemes, they may fail because they are too complex and require too much administration. Moreo-
ver, user fees generally failed to generate substantial revenue. Fees were most successful when cou-
pled with increases in quality and when they were retained locally. Based on the collective action 
argument outlined in the theoretical section, the last point is paramount. As Gilson notes 
(1997:278), the incentive to collect fees is undermined when they can not be used to improve quali-
ty locally, and citizens should also have less incentive to pay if it does not benefit them directly. 
 
Gelson argues that user fees generally failed to generate substantial revenue because income of the 
users is so low, and it may be that user fees will do little in areas of extreme poverty. But in the 
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Cambodian case, it was estimated that informal payments made up about 45 percent of the hospi-
tal’s monthly revenues. In that case, it is clear that user fees should be able to generate more cost 
recovery than the up to ten percent of expenditures reported in African countries (Gilson 1997). 
 
Even though user fees may have undesirable consequences, such as supressing utilization among 
the poor or incurring “catastrophic” expenditures, there may be few alternatives. In Uganda, public 
health was officially free until 1993, but district health authorities were then given the right to im-
pose fees. However, before the reform, informal payments were widespread (Xu et al 2006). In 
2001 user fees were abolished, and the government increased funding to compensate for the loss of 
revenue. After the reform utilization for the poor increased, but at a lower rate than in the years 
preceding the reform, and the probability that poor would be exposed to catastrophic health ex-
penditure was not lower after the reform. Xu and collegues speculate that this may be due to the 
fact that drugs became less available after the reform, and that patients therefore had to buy them 
themselves, seek out private providers, or even that informal payments returned to compenstate 
providers for lost revenue (Xu et al 2006:873). Xu and collegues also discuss the importance of 
retaining collected user fees at the local level. When fees are replaced with government transfers, 
problems of ensuring that sufficient funds actually reach the hospitals ensue, and are exasperated in 
corrupt settings. 
 
To summarize, the theory suggests that it is difficult to achieve functional financing of public ser-
vice provision, and that informal payments for public services may arise as a way to shortcut collec-
tive action problems and ensure some service provision. Given the limitations on state capacity, 
economic theory seems to suggest that some undesirable consequences of informal payments re-
sulting from secrecy and lack of coordination could be avoided by formalizing and regulating the 
informal payments. The introduction of user fees in modern health care has had mixed results, but 
 16 
retention of revenue at the local level seems crucial, which is expected from theory, as to avoid 
collective action problems.  
 
In the early days of corruption research, well-known scholars put forth the proposition that corrup-
tion actually may be good for economic development. For instance, although he came to the con-
clusion that corruption in general is detrimental to political development, Joseph Nye (1967:417) 
argued that “Corruption has probably been, on balance, a positive factor in both Russian and 
American economic development.” My argument however differs from so called “revisionists” in 
important aspects, which necessitates a brief review of the early pro-corruption arguments. 
 
Nathanial Leff (1964) has made the perhaps most prominent case for corruption. His point of de-
parture is that governments often are ineffective and uninterested in fostering growth. Corruption 
may then serve to counteract the harmful impact of government in society, for instance by incentiv-
izing bureaucrats to promote regulation that is beneficial to economic activity, or by serving as a 
“hedge against bad policy”. Corruption allows entrepreneurs to have an influence in policy-making, 
which should lead to better policies than those promoted by the government. 
 
The major problem of Leff’s argument is that it fails to acknowledge that there are many players in 
the bribe game, and that it is a repeated game. For instance, he argues that corruption can reduce 
uncertainty in investment, as “the personalist and irrational style of decision-making, and the fre-
quent changes in government personnel and policies add to the risks”. By bribing policy-makers, 
business-groups can ensure continued support in their economic undertakings. Leff thus hypothe-
sizes that corruption encourages investment. However, if one entrepreneur can bribe a policy-
maker, so can another. Only the entrepreneur that knows that she can afford the highest bribes can 
therefore be certain that her preferred policies will remain unchanged. Empirical research has also 
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disproved Leff’s hypothesis, showing that growth is slower in more corrupt countries, and that an 
important reason is corruption-induced uncertainty (Mauro 1995; Wei 1997). 
 
Because Leff sees governments as ineffective and misguided, anything that can reduce government 
influence becomes a good thing, even grand corruption (which not is the focus of this paper). This 
paper takes as its point of departure that a venal and corrupt bureaucracy in general is harmful and 
inferior to a well-functioning Weberian bureaucracy, which most available research seems to con-
firm. However, compared to a situation where no services are delivered to the public because the 
state lacks capacity to fund a bureaucracy, petty corruption may resolve some issues. Therefore, 
systems of informal payments naturally develop in the absence of well-functioning bureaucracies. If 
that is the case, I argue, it may be better to accept the situation and legalize and formalize this sys-
tem, rather than to let it go unregulated. If instituting a modern Weberian bureaucracy was possible, 
that would however be preferable. But as that option normally is unavailable, legalization could be 
the best course of action. 
 
A recent insight in research is that a corrupt state apparatus not is an exception to the rule of good 
governance historically, but rather the norm (North, Wallis and Weingast 2009; Persson, Rothstein 
and Teorell forthcoming). A good theory of how to eradicate corruption could therefore be more 
likely to emanate from the study of industrialized western countries that have managed to escape 
corruption, rather than from the study of corrupt countries. Promising work in this area include the 
work of James Hollyer (2011), in a study of meritocratic reforms in bureaucracies in Western coun-
tries during the 18th and 19th centuries, as well as Mircea Popa’s (2011) study of the end of British 
“Old Corruption” in the 19th century. In the following, I take the same approach in a study of Swe-
dish wage reforms during the 19th century. 
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The Swedish experience 
In this section, I aim to demonstrate several points. First, that the Swedish government early on 
chose a system of financing the wages of bureaucrats that resembled a capitulation wage regime, 
reliant on semi-informal payments. The reason for doing so was, I argue, that the state did neither 
have sufficient monitoring capability to monitor the work effort of bureaucrats, nor funds to fi-
nance their wages. Second, that politicians of the time believed that regulation of the system would 
be beneficial. The third points is that the system was gradually transformed, first through heavier 
reliance on user fees (in the form of stamp taxes), and only later on into an almost entirely tax-
funded regime with fixed salaries. The Swedish experience thus demonstrates the feasabilitty of a 
gradual approach, first through formalization, than substitution for user fees, and only then to tax-
es. 
 
The capitulation wage regime 
In Sweden before the 19th century, few bureaucrats received fixed salaries from the state. Instead, 
many employees were financed through decentralized systems. In the cases of the kings extended 
arm, the bailiffs, a decentralized system was conciously designed from above. The bailiffs were 
responsible for collecting taxes and upholding law and order. Between 1696 and 1855, the bailiffs 
took their pay directly from the peasants. Under this system, peasants were obliged to support 
some officials with goods. The delivery of these goods naturally incurred a cost for the peasant, 
who therefore could agree on a sum (subject to mutual agreement) of money to pay directly to the 
official instead. The official however had the right to demand delivery of goods instead of cash, 
which allowed him to get a better price from the peasants, who were fierce opponents of the sys-
tem which they claimed lead to extortion (Westerhult 1962:121 ff). But parts of the system of fi-
nancing the wages for the bailiffs was not conciously designed. Bailiffs also had extra income in the 
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form of “sportler” (deriving from the latin word sportula, meaning gift). The sportler system evolved 
as a way to fund the bailiffs as new tasks were assigned to them over time (Westerhult 1965:124).  
 
Other employees also had sportler, but the nature and size could vary considerably, as it was a term 
for any extra income that the civil servants received in their service. They could be percentages and 
provisions on raised revenue, but in most cases they were fees for written documents of various 
kinds, such as licenses or copies of verdicts from courts. It was then usually called “expedi-
tionstaxa” (expedition tax), but fit under the umbrella term sportler. 
 
For customs officials, a rate for sportler had been established in 1686. Due to inflation, the rate 
however soon became obsolete. In 1828, the customs board noted that inofficial rates had spring 
up “partly through mutual agreement between traders and customs servants, partly through forcible 
extraction by the latter”.2  A representative of the Burghers in the Riksdag of the Estates 3  of 
1828/30 also claimed that sportler existed because of “personal benevolence and friendship for the 
customs officials”.4 
 
There are many similarities between the situation outlined here and Besley and McLaren’s capitula-
tion wage regime. The state pays very low wages, but bureaucrats still work because they supple-
ment their income with informal payments, in this case called sportler. The difference is that in Bes-
ley and McLaren’s model, tax collectors and citizens collude to deprive the state of funds, to the 
benefit of both parties. Regarding informal payments, it is rather the case that citizens and state 
employees engage in a transaction where the employee provides the citizen with some service, and 
                                                     
2 Protocol of the Estate of Burghers, 1828/30, collection 6, page 834 ff. 
3 In contrast to european practice, the Swedish Riksdag had four estates instead of three: Nobility, Clergy, Burghers 
and Peasants. 
4 Protocol of the Estate of Burghers, 1828/30, collection 6, page 834 ff. 
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the citizen pays the employee directly. For instance, sportler to customs officials could be in the 
form of food during the trip for pilots that guided ships in the archipelago, or renumeration for 
carriers that carried ships’ goods to the warehouse.5 Of course, other types of payments were not of 
this nature, such as tolls on goods, of which some parts went to customs officials (especially man-
agers) and some parts went to the crown. 
 
I hence argue that systems of informal payments can arise because of two different but interrelated 
reasons. One reason is because citizens demand services, and engage in private contracts with ser-
vice providers, as in the case of health care provision. But systems are also attractive for rulers, 
because they are decentralized and place minimal demands on the administrative capacity of the 
state, an argument that will be developed in the next section. By tolerating informal payments, the 
ruler can provide some public services as well as obtain some revenue, as in Besley and McLaren’s 
capitulation wage regime. Before the 19th century, Swedish rulers to a large extent chose this strate-
gy.6 
 
An obvious and important difference between bribes or informal payments for public services and 
the Swedish sportler is that sportler not were illegal. However, it is clear that they not were seen as 
entirely legal, and not were as accepted as formal user fees. A lengthy debate in the Riksdag of the 
Estates in 1834/35 illuminates the arguments for and against abolishing sportler. A member of the 
House of Nobility, Count Hamilton were in favor of abolishing sportler entirely, and especially in 
the courts: “Long have I found it inappropriate and contrary to the dignity of Agencies and Courts, 
to sell justice by the sheet”, refering to sportler paid for various documents relating to trials.7 He 
                                                     
5 Swedish Collection of Laws, 1829, N:o 4. 
6 During the early 17th century, the government also briefly experimented with outright tax farming, another decentral-
ized system of revenue-generation, but the system met with hard opposition from the peasantry and was soon abol-
ished (Hallenberg 2008). 
7 Ibid. 
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proceeds to call sportler “repulsive” both for bureaucrats and for citizens. Many members of the 
Riksdag of the Estates agreed with Hamilton, for instance Count Cronhjelm: “The sportel-system, 
which hitherto has been practiced, is a system of extortion, that ill stand together with a civil serv-
ant’s situation in general and is as condemnable for those, who takes, as for those, who gives.”8 It is 
also clear from the debates of the time that the system was easy to abuse. In the Estate of the Cler-
gy, the member and priest Mittag in 1834 related a story about a poor priest who was forced to sell 
a cow to pay the sportler for a document he had not requested.9 
 
So why were sportler accepted? The main reason was because of the low demands it placed on the 
state. Mr Halling, a member of the Estate of Burghers and the Temporary Tax Committee, estimat-
ed that sportler all over the country amounted to about one million Riksdaler, a huge sum, and that 
they generally were undesirable, but that they could not be abolished at the time. The reason, ac-
cording to Halling, was lacking administrative capacity, both in tax collection and resource alloca-
tion: “When one knows, with which difficulty it is associated, to properly distribute tax income, and 
how little, it is possible, to please everyone, is it not worth, to ponder the possibility, to find an 
easier way to collect a tax, that is indirect, and among which the issue at hand [sportler] also may be 
counted.”10 
 
Sportler was thus seen as an indirect tax, which automatically was allocated to where there were 
needs – a convenient way of financing public activities for the state. Westerhult (1963:134) argues 
that an influential view of bureaucrats at the time was that they were entrepreneurs, who had a 
contract with the state to perform some duties, but their method of doing so was their concern. 
They could for instance hire assistants and deputies, but had to pay them out of the sportler in-
                                                     
8 Protocol of the Estate of the Nobility, 1834/35, collection 7, p. 148 ff. 
9 Protocol of the Estate of the Clergy, 1834/35, collection 6, p. 57 ff. 
10 Protocol of the Estate of Burghers, 1834/35, collection 3, p. 107 ff. 
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come. Chester (1981:62) describes a similar situation in Britain during the time of “Old corrup-
tion”. Government officials were renumerated by fees collected for services, and “As the demands 
on a Court or an Office grew, so did the income derived from fees, so providing some or all of the 
money out of which to pay for more clerks and assistance.” 
 
One reason for tolerating sportler was thus related to the difficulty of collecting revenue and allo-
cating it properly. Another reason was that if the state were to abolish sportler and replace it with 
fixed salaries for bureaucrats, the bureaucrats would have less incentives to work, which would 
require more monitoring. When the government proposed to abolish sportler in the central gov-
ernment offices to the Riksdag of the Estates 1834/35, much of the scepticism was due to lack of 
trust in bureaucrats. Conceding that it in principle would be preferred if income in the form of the 
“generally inappropriate” sportler were to be exchanged for fixed salaries, the Riksdag’s State 
Committee feared that fees would exceed former sportler, and also that the state would be unable 
to monitor if the employees reported all collected fees. In sum, this could thus result in higher ex-
penses for the state, as employees could receive a salary and still pocket the income.11 
 
In his study of the English “Old Corruption”, Mircea Popa (2011:20) comes to the same conclu-
sion: “A system in which the governance good is produced by unregulated monopolists is socially 
inefficient, but has the advantage of being largely self-enforcing. Taxpayers lose because monopo-
list government officials capture more rents for themselves, but do not have to pay the monitoring 
costs of a modern administrative system.” 
 
 
                                                     
11 Statement from the State Committe N:o 80, appendage to the protocol of the Riksdag of the Estates 1834/35. 
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Formalization and regulation 
The sportler system had evolved largely without legislation on the matter. The first mention of 
sportler in a registry of laws dates to 1661, in which a specification of the rates for “verdicts, letters 
and instrument, which by the courts in the country and in the cities are delivered” (Quiding 
1865:86). The next law about sportler was passed in 1686 and specified the rates for customs serv-
ants. In 1720 rates for the Royal office were specified. A few laws were subsequently passed most 
decades until the beginning of the 19th century, when legislative activity increased dramatically, as 
can be seen in Figure 1. The bars represent the number of laws passed each decade, and in the dec-
ades where there are no bars, no laws were passed, according to an inventory of laws compiled by 
Quiding (1865). 
 
FIGURE 1. LAWS CONCERNING SPORTLER PASSED EACH DECADE, 1660-1850. 
 
Data source: Qviding (1865). 
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From the 1820’s and onwards, legislative activity increased, and over 20 laws or directives were 
passed each decade. Some of them were merely clarifications of previously enacted laws, but still 
signal an increased interest in the question. However, my reading of the laws passed during this 
period is that most of the legislative activity not were aimed at prohibiting sportler. Rather, it was 
part of an effort to formalize and regulate it. One example can be taken from the customs. In 1829, 
new rates for sportler to customs servants was set by the king. In it were specified the amount to 
pay for various services performed by civil servants, from the writing of permits, to weighing of 
metals, to the carrying of goods from the ship to the customs house by the carriers.12 In its appeal 
to the king for instituting the new rates, the Customs Board did not argue that the system was ideal, 
on the contrary, they noted that “under several circumstances it could be argued, that the abolition 
of income of this type were both for the public good and for civil servants desirable”.13 The argu-
ment was instead that sportler existed anyway, and it would be better to regulate it than to let it 
proceed unchecked. However, the Customs Board did not argue in favor of setting fixed salaries 
for the customs. Instituting fixed salaries would incur a large cost on the state, and would also make 
the state responsible for support during retirement. It was also argued that servants who received a 
fixed salary would put in considerably less effort. 
 
Formalization however implies acceptance. The previously mentioned customs rates were opposed 
by the Estate of Burghers. They acknowledged that sportler existed, but also argued that it was 
mostly voluntary to pay, and that institutionalizing it with a new rate only would reinforce the prac-
tice, which would make it more burdensome for traders. The representative who brought up the 
                                                     
12 Swedish Collection of Laws, 1829, N:o 4. 
13 Protocol of the Estate of Burghers, 1828/30, collection 6, page 834 ff. 
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issue still thought that sportler was appropriate for services where extra effort was required on be-
half of the official, such as the weighing of metals, and the provision of written documents.14 
 
While formalization risks increasing prevalence of payments, it allows for regulation to prevent 
abuse. In the case of the new customs rates, the rates gave bureaucrats the right to demand sportler 
for provided services, but also imposed obligations on the bureaucrats. The law stipulates that the 
document containing the rates should be attached to the wall of each customs chamber, guardpost, 
weighing station and warehouse, so that everybody would know the rates. Furthermore, since the 
rates concerning written documents were specified in terms of the number of pages, the law also 
stated that each page must not contain less then 24 rows, with margins no more than three fingers 
wide, and with a style of hand that not should be unusually wide. A civil servant caught in breach of 
this regulation should pay a fine, of which one third went to the Crown and two thirds to the per-
son who notified the authorities.15 Users of the service were thus rewarded for keeping civil serv-
ants in check. 
 
Furthermore, since the law made it explicitly legal to demand sportler, the government could also 
demand more information about the amount of sportler raised. Customs offices were in the law 
required to send detailed reports about the number of vessels dealt with and the amount of cargo, 
as well as the sportler sums and how sportler were divided among custom servants. Formalization 
of the informal payments thus allowed for an increase in monitoring capacity. Later on, when fixed 
salaries were introduced for the majority of Swedish bureaucrats, many received compensation for 
lost sportler, based on the amounts previously collected by the individual bureaucrat. 
 
                                                     
14 Protocol of the Estate of Burghers, 1828/30, collection 6, page 834 ff. 
15 Swedish Collection of Laws, 1829, N:o 4. 
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Transformation into user fees 
The first step was thus to regulate and standardize sportler. This was gradually followed by the 
substitution of sportler for user fees in the form of taxes on stamped paper, so called Charta Sigilla-
ta, first in a reform of the salary system in the central government offices in 1834/35. Some im-
portant documents were before the reform required to be written on this stamped paper, which 
were associated with a fee payed to the crown, but guaranteed the documents authenticity. By sub-
stituting sportler for Charta Sigillata fees of the same amount, no extra burden would be placed on 
citizens, but the Crown would receive more income, which then could be used to pay fixed salaries 
to the civil servants.16 
 
A short explanation of the concept of stamp taxes (also called stamp duty), as the Charta Sigillata are 
an example of, is here called for. Basically, stamp taxes are a fee levied on written documents, usual-
ly permits, deeds, bonds, and contracts of various kinds. The concept was invented in Holland in 
1624 to raise revenue, and was adopted in England in 1694 and in the United States in acts of Con-
gress in 1797 and 1813 (Powell 1935). Documents are either required to be written on specifically 
printed paper, or have stamps attached to them, to be considered valid. The main advantage of a 
stamp tax is that it is relatively easy to collect, since citizens have an interest in paying the tax, since 
they want their documents to be valid. In a report by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the 
USA in 1863, the commissioner claimed that the stamp tax was “among the most satisfactory 
branches of our excise law” (Cited in Powell 1935:228). It should however be noted that the British 
attempt to impose a stamp tax on the American colonies in 1765 was one of the factors that 
sparked the American revolution (Morgan and Morgan 1953), so the fact that they are convenient 
for the government does not guarantee their popularity. 
 
                                                     
16 Royal Proposition 1, appendage to the protocol of the Riksdag of the Estates 1834, collection 1:1, p. 4-5. 
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For citizens, the reform did most likely not lead to a reduction in amounts payed for services. The 
main change was in the way bureaucrats were salaried. Sportler may seem similar to user fees, but a 
crucial difference is that sportler are retained directly by the bureaucrat while user fees are adminis-
tered by the institution, which causes collective action problems to arise. Bureaucrats can under 
such a scheme attempt to renege on work or withhold collected user fees. The main objection to 
the Swedish reform was thus that bureaucrats would work less diligently if their salary did not de-
pend on their effort.17 In approving the reform, the Riksdag of the Estates stipulated that monitor-
ing in the central government offices would have to increase. The Riksdag thus reasoned along the 
lines of the theory of Besley and McLaren: if the state is to invest in higher salaries, it also needs to 
invest in better monitoring. 
 
Following the abolition of sportler among the central government offices, it was also abolished 
among customs servants in 184218 and among many other branches of government in a big reform 
1855-1860, in which fixed salaries were introduced for a majority of government employees. A 
member of the House of Nobility, Mr Palmcrantz, in 1860 proposed to abolish sportler whereever 
it remained and substitute it with fixed salaries financed through the sale of stamped paper,19 but 
the economy committee rejected the motion on the grounds that the only officials that by then 
were dependent on sportler as their primary income were judges in the country courts, the Härad-
shövdingar. Sportler reform would according to the committee have to be accompanied by wage 
reform, and as major reform just had been undertaken in which the country court judges had been 
exempted, it was not appropriate to attempt another such reform.20 Sportler remained, but for offi-
                                                     
17 Statement from the State Committe N:o 80, appendage to the protocol of the Riksdag of the Estates 1834/35. 
18 Swedish Collection of Laws, 1842, N:o 42. 
19 Protocol of the Estate of the Nobility, 1859/60, collection 10, p. 158. 
20 Appendage to the protocol of the Riksdag, 1859/60, collection 4, part 1, N:o 53. Administration in cities and the 
country were clearly separated, and the country courts operated under different rules than the courts in the cities. 
 28 
cials other than the country court judges it was after the reform only a minor supplement to the 
fixed salary. 
 
As mentioned earlier, Riksdag representatives stressed the importance of pairing the wage increases 
in the central government offices 1835 with increased monitoring of the government officials. It is 
also telling that the encompassing wage reform in 1858-1860 was followed by a new criminal code 
that for the first time regulated misconduct in public office (Rothstein 2011). In Figure 2, I have 
compiled data on misconduct in public office from the official crime statistics between 1857 and 
1912, dividing crimes into serious (bribery, etc) and minor (misconduct) offences. Both curves 
slope downward from the 1860’s, indicating that discovered corrupt practices decreased during the 
latter half of the 19th century. The wage reforms were hence followed by increased professionaliza-
tion of the bureaucracy, an observation that is consistent with earlier research on the timing of 
modernization of the Swedish state (Rothstein 1998). 
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FIGURE 2. FREQUENCY OF MINOR (UPPER LINE) AND SERIOUS (LOWER LINE) CRIMES IN THE 
SWEDISH PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, 1857-1912, WITH LOCAL POLYNOMIAL SMOOTHED LINES. 
 
Data source: Bidrag till Sveriges officiella statistik B: Rättsväsendet, editions 1857-1912. Vertical lines represent changes in the 
reporting of the statistics. 
 
By increasing the use of stamped paper in offices were sportler was reduced, critics in the Riksdag 
were assured that the higher wages would not burden their constituents (if they were not users of 
the services, that is) and also had the benefit of allocating resources to where they were needed. 
The importance of stamp taxes as a source of income increased during the entire 19th century, as 
can be seen in Figure 3, where I have plotted the ratio between stamp taxes and government con-
sumption (for reference) between 1809 and 1899. The upward-sloping line demonstrates that while 
stamp taxes never were a major source of income for the Swedish government, it became more and 
more important during the entire 19th century. 
 
 30 
FIGURE 3. STAMP TAX INCOME IN RELATION TO GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION, 1809-1899. 
 
 
Exchanging sportler for user fees in the form of stamp taxes requires more monitoring effort on 
behalf of the state. But the state may also profit in the long run, as surplus revenue is redirected 
from bureaucrats to the government. An argument put forth by several members of the Estate of 
the Nobility in the debate about sportler in the central government offices in 1834 was that while 
net revenue may be unchanged in the short run, sale of stamped paper was likely to increase in the 
future, something the baron Ehrenborg claimed that other European countries had profited from.21 
 
Furthermore, poorly designed incentive schemes can be costly if conditions change. In England 
some fees to government bureaucrats were calculated as a percentage of money involved in transac-
                                                     
21 Protocol of the Estate of the Nobility, 1834/35, collection 7, p. 209, and 11, p 283. 
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tions the bureaucrat handled, so called poundage. The system worked when handling larger sums of 
money was more laborious (due to the weight!), but when paper money became more common, the 
connection between poundage and involved effort for the official disappeared. During the Ameri-
can War, government activity increased tremendously, which led to massive incomes for the gov-
ernment officials whose income were based on poundage. Chester (1981:63) writes that £62,000 
was paid in poundage in 1780, which highlighted the flaws of the system and led to calls for reform. 
The system was thus reformed when it started to deprive the government of major sums of money, 
a reason for reform highlighted also by other scholars (Popa 2011:19). 
 
Discussion 
The Swedish example thus demonstrates that an integral part of moving from a decentralized sys-
tem where services are funded by direct payments to bureaucrats to a centralized tax-financed sys-
tem are the intermediate steps of formalization and user fees. Formalization requires little in the 
form of benevolence from the ruler, but may also bring about improvements for economic effi-
ciency and for citizens. It is clear from the quotes from Swedish politicians that an important rea-
son for not abolishing sportler was that it actually worked. The system raised revenue by itself, and 
allocated the revenue to bureaucrats in positions where there were demand for services. With in-
creased formalization, the benefits of the decentralized system remained, while problems of inde-
pendent price-setting which could lower overall demand and secrecy were alleviated. 
 
Collective action problems are present to varying degrees in the three stages of direct payments, 
user fees and tax financing. When service to a large degree is financed through direct payments, 
collective action problems are for the most part avoided. Citizens pay for the services they receive 
directly, and bureaucrats work for direct payment. With user fees, it is necessary that bureaucrats 
report fees to the institution, and that the institution uses the fees to finance the wages of the local 
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bureaucrats. If not, citizens and bureaucrats may revert to diret payments in the manner described 
by Besley and MacLaren, as they both profit from withholding revenues from the institution. Mod-
ern user fee-experiences corroborate this, showing that fee schemes fail when fees are passed on 
beyond the local service institution (Gilson 1997). Tax-funded systems entail the most collective 
action problems, as the link between payment (taxes) and service delivery is very long, and requires 
that citizens believe that others will pay taxes, and that bureaucrats trust the state (and their local 
service institution) to reward them for their work effort. I argue that if a too difficult funding 
scheme is attempted without the necessary monitoring capacity as well as the capacity to raise and 
allocate revenue, it is likely that informal, direct payments will be the result. If state capacity is lack-
ing, it is thus better to attempt the first intermediate step – formalizing informal payments. 
 
One major problem of formalizing informal payments for services that officially are free is however 
that set rates tend to work regressively, and place a heavy burden on the poorest. This problem was 
acknowledged by a Swedish member of the House of Nobility, Mr EhrenCrona, in 1720 when a 
new expedition tax was introduced. After being informed that poor would be exempted from the 
tax, EhrenCrona questioned how the poor would be identified, and the House then decided that 
those claiming to be poor would have to apply for testing of the claim at a royal government office 
(Cancellie-Collegium).22 Allowing for discretion in deciding who is eligible for exemptions is probably 
a recipe for corruption, as examples both from Vietnam and Russia show that exemptions primarily 
are distributed to those with connections to the bureaucrats (Ensor 2004). It seems crucial that 
exemption schemes are based on easily observable indicators such as those reportedly used in the 
Cambodian hospital referred to earlier (Barber, Bonnet and Bekedam 2004). For instance, Swedish 
records from 1912 show that midwives were payed directly for each delivery, and that payment 
                                                     
22 Protocol of the Estate of the Nobility, 1720, p. 235. 
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often was linked to the socioeconomic status of the family. In one case, the fee was 1 Crown for 
crofters and other poor, 4 Crowns for home-owners and 5 Crowns for landlords and officials.23 
 
Conclusion 
In economics and political science, the study of corruption has ballooned the last 20 years. Howev-
er, much of the existing research is focused on political corruption, or on corruption in general. 
Similarly, political corruption is hard to address, as it benefits those in power. Bureaucratic petty 
corruption remains understudied, which is unfortunate, as it is the kind of corruption that most 
directly affects ordinary people. The issue of informal payments has however received much atten-
tion in health policy research. I argue that the two fields have much in common and could benefit 
from greater exchange. When the capacity or political will to implement and enforce major reform 
of the type enacted in Singapore is absent, one way forward may be to formalize informal pay-
ments. A Bulgarian study showed that a majority of respondents were in favor of formalizing the 
informal payments (Delcheva, Balabanova and McKee 1997), and tentative evidence show that if 
done right, it may actually improve utilization (Barber, Bonnet and Mekedam 2004). Furthermore, 
in line with the recent push to understand the processes in which industrialized countries managed 
to reduce corruption historically, I argue that gradual formalization of informal payments and then 
substitution for user fees were crucial intermediate steps in the move towards Swedens now well-
known and tax-financed welfare state. 
 
  
                                                     
23 Contribution to the official statistics of Sweden, X) Salaries and pensions, I:9. 1912, p. 53. 
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